2.2 Civil Rights- Lecture Outline

14th Amendment- Equal Protection Clause-Civil Rights Act 1964

Amendment XIV

Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

 

Equal Protection Clause: No State Shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This was included by the Framers to guarantee the equality of protection of the laws given to blacks and whites. Equality with respect to civil rights meant equal status in the legal relations of the private economy, coupled with the right to enforce that equal status. Equality with respect to political rights was more controversial at the at the outset, with many supporters of equal civil rights opposed to equal voting rights for African Americans. This discrepancy was resolved by the passage of the 15th Amendment.

 

                  Equal protection laws can be described in two ways. First, the Court distinguishes between statutes that themselves utilize racial or other 'suspect" classifications, and statutes that though state in non-racial terms, nonetheless have a "disparate impact" on racial minorities. If the statutes use racial terms, they must survive strict scrutiny. The use of racial terms means that the legislature must be trying to promote extremely important social goals and the establishment of racial categories is essential if that goal is to be met. If this is not the objective, then the statutes have created suspect classes. If the statute does not name race classification yet its intent is still to deliver a disparate impact upon minorities, then strict scrutiny will apply. If the statute creates a disparate impact upon minorities but it is as a secondary effect, not the primary intent of the law, then strict scrutiny is not automatically triggered.

 

Suspect Classification: The Constitution only prohibits discrimination that is invidious, arbitrary, or irrational. The validity of the government action depends largely on the criterion on which the discrimination is based. All other classifications are suspect. The Court has declared that Race and Religion are suspect classes, thus any law that discriminates upon these classes will be deemed unconstitutional. The Court has yet to elevate gender to the level of suspect classification.

 

Strict Scrutiny: This is triggered when a law discriminates against a class that has fallen under suspect classification or is infringing upon a fundamental right. Under strict scrutiny, the burden of proof is upon the government to prove that the statute that is discriminatory seeks to achieve a compelling government interest, that which is far greater than an individual's rights. Very few laws pass the Strict Scrutiny test.

 

Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny or Quasi-Suspect-Classification: This level of scrutiny requires that the government’s intent is only substantially related to an important government interest. This level would regulate social and economic classifications as well as statutes based upon age, sexual orientation, and physical or mental handicaps.

 

Rational Basis Test: The burden of proof is upon the individual attaching the law to sustain that the law is discriminatory. The justification of the discrimination can advance a social need without discriminating against individuals.

 

De facto discrimination or segregation- those actions of discrimination or segregation that take place by virtue of custom or social standard but are not enforced by law. Thus, situations of de facto discrimination or segregation can be remedied by an action of an individual or the introduction of legislation.

 

De jure discrimination or segregation- those actions of discrimination or segregation that are established and upheld by law.

 

 

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark piece of legislation in the United States Links to an external site. that outlawed major forms of discrimination against blacks and women, including racial segregation. It ended unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial segregation Links to an external site. in schools, at the workplace and by facilities that served the general public ("public accommodations"). Powers given to enforce the act were initially weak, but were supplemented during later years. Congress asserted its authority to legislate under several different parts of the United States Constitution Links to an external site., principally its power to regulate interstate commerce Links to an external site. under Article One Links to an external site. (section 8), its duty to guarantee all citizens equal protection Links to an external site. of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment Links to an external site. and its duty to protect voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment Links to an external site..

 

Title I- Barred unequal application of voter registration requirements, but did not abolish literacy tests sometimes used to disqualify African Americans and poor white voters.

Title II- Outlawed discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, and all other public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce; exempted private clubs without defining "private," thereby allowing a loophole.

Title III- Encouraged the desegregation of public schools and authorized the U. S. Attorney General to file suits to force desegregation, but did not authorize busing as a means to overcome segregation based on residence.

Title IV- Authorized but did not require withdrawal of federal funds from programs which practiced discrimination.

Title V- Outlawed discrimination in employment in any business exceeding twenty five people and creates an Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to review complaints, although it lacked meaningful enforcement powers.

Title VI- Prevents discrimination by government agencies that receive federal funds. If an agency is found in violation of Title VI, that agency can lose its federal funding

Title VII- Title VII of the Act prohibits discrimination by covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Title VII also prohibits discrimination against an individual because of his or her association with another individual of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An employer cannot discriminate against a person because of his interracial association with another, such as by an interracial marriage

Title VIII- Required compilation of voter-registration and voting data in geographic areas specified by the Commission on Civil Rights.

Title IX- Title IX made it easier to move civil rights cases from state courts with segregationist judges and all-white juries to federal court. This was of crucial importance to civil rights activists who could not get a fair trial in state courts.

Title X-Established the Community Relations Service, tasked with assisting in community disputes involving claims of discrimination.

Title XI-Title XI gives the Jury rights to put any proceeding for criminal contempt arising under title II, III, IV, V, VI, or VII of the Civil Rights Act, on trial, and if convicted, can be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned for more than six months

 

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 

A landmark piece of national legislation Links to an external site. in the United States Links to an external site. that outlawed discriminatory voting practices that had been responsible for the widespread disenfranchisement Links to an external site. of African Americans Links to an external site. in the U.S. Echoing the language of the 15th Amendment Links to an external site., the Act prohibits states from imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Specifically, Congress Links to an external site. intended the Act to outlaw the practice of requiring otherwise qualified voters to pass literacy tests Links to an external site. in order to register to vote, a principal means by which Southern states had prevented African Americans from exercising the franchise. The Act was signed into law Links to an external site. by President Links to an external site. Lyndon B. Johnson Links to an external site., who had earlier signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 Links to an external site. into law.

The Act established extensive federal oversight of elections administration, providing that states with a history of discriminatory voting practices (so-called "covered jurisdictions" Links to an external site.) could not implement any change affecting voting without first obtaining the approval of the Department of Justice Links to an external site., a process known as preclearance Links to an external site.. These enforcement provisions applied to states and political subdivisions (mostly in the South Links to an external site.) that had used a "device" to limit voting and in which less than 50 percent of the population was registered to vote in 1964. The Act has been renewed and amended by Congress four times, the most recent being a 25-year extension signed into law by President George W. Bush Links to an external site. in 2006.

 

 

 

 

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 

"No person in the U.S. shall, on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal aid."

 

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA) is a law that was enacted by the U.S. Congress Links to an external site. in 1990

The ADA is a wide-ranging civil rights Links to an external site. law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, discrimination Links to an external site. based on disability Links to an external site.. It affords similar protections against discrimination to Americans with disabilities Links to an external site. as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Links to an external site., which made discrimination based on race Links to an external site., religion Links to an external site., sex Links to an external site., national origin, and other characteristics illegal. Disability is defined by the ADA as "...a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity." The determination of whether any particular condition is considered a disability is made on a case by case basis. Certain specific conditions are excluded as disabilities, such as current substance abuse and visual impairment that is correctable by prescription lenses.

 

History of the 14^th Amendment- Application

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,  (1886),

This is the first case where the United States Supreme Court Links to an external site. ruled that a law that is race-neutral on its face, but is administered in a prejudicial manner, is an infringement of the Equal Protection Clause Links to an external site. in the Fourteenth Amendment Links to an external site. to the U.S. Constitution Links to an external site..

 

Background

In the 1880s, Chinese immigrants to California Links to an external site. faced many legal and economic hurdles, including discriminatory provisions in the California Constitution Links to an external site.. As a result, they were excluded, either by law or by bias, from many professions. Many turned to the laundry Links to an external site. business and in San Francisco Links to an external site. about 89% of the laundry workers were of Chinese descent.

In 1880, the city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that persons could not operate a laundry in a wooden building without a permit from the Board of Supervisors Links to an external site.. The ordinance conferred upon the Board of Supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold the permits. At the time, about 95% of the city's 320 laundries were operated in wooden buildings. Approximately two-thirds of those laundries were owned by Chinese persons. Although most of the city's wooden building laundry owners applied for a permit, none were granted to any Chinese owner, while only one out of approximately eighty non-Chinese applicants was denied a permit.

Yick Wo who had lived in California Links to an external site. and had operated a laundry in the same wooden building for many years and held a valid license to operate his laundry issued by the Board of Fire-Wardens, continued to operate his laundry and was convicted and fined $10.00 for violating the ordinance Links to an external site.. He sued for a writ of habeas corpus Links to an external site. after he was imprisoned in default for having refused to pay the fine.

 

Issue before the Court

The state argued that the ordinance was strictly one out of concern for safety, as laundries of the day often needed very hot stoves to boil water for laundry, and indeed laundry fires were not unknown and often resulted in the destruction of adjoining buildings as well. However, the petitioner pointed out that prior to the new ordinance, the inspection and approval of laundries in wooden buildings had been left up to fire wardens. Yick Wo's laundry had never failed an inspection for fire safety. Moreover, the application of the prior law focused only on laundries in crowded areas of the city, while the new law was being enforced on isolated wooden buildings as well. The law also ignored other wooden buildings where fires were common—even cooking stoves posed the same risk as those used for laundries.

Opinion of the Court

The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Matthews Links to an external site., found that the administration of the statute in question was discriminatory and that there was therefore no need to even consider whether the ordinance itself was lawful. Even though the Chinese laundry owners were usually not American citizens Links to an external site., the court ruled they were still entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.. He denounced the law as a blatant attempt to exclude Chinese from the laundry trade in San Francisco, and the court struck down the law, ordering dismissal of all charges against other laundry owners who had been jailed.

 

 

 

Legacy

Yick Wo had little application shortly after the decision. In fact, it was not long after that the Court developed the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson Links to an external site., 163 U.S. 537 Links to an external site. (1896), in practice allowing discriminatory treatment of African Americans Links to an external site.. Yick Wo was never applied at the time to Jim Crow laws Links to an external site. which, although also racially neutral, were in practice discriminatory against blacks. However, by the 1950s, the Warren Court Links to an external site. used the principle established in Yick Wo to strike down several attempts by states and municipalities in the Deep South Links to an external site. to limit the political rights of blacks. Yick Wo has been cited in well over 150 Supreme Court cases since it was decided.

Yick Wo is cited in Hirabayashi v. United States Links to an external site. (320 US 81, 1943) to recognize that: "Distinctions between citizens solely based because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection." However, the US Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Gordon Hirabayashi Links to an external site., the Japanese American Links to an external site. who tested the curfew law and refused to register for the forced internment of people of Japanese descent during World War II Links to an external site..

 

WWII- Japanese Internment

Korematsu v. US (1945)

During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.

 

The Constitutional Question 

Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

 

The Conclusion: Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."

 

Ex parte Endo, or Ex parte Mitsuye Endo (1944)

The term ex parte is used in a case name to signify that the suit was brought by the person whose name follows the term. Under the Fifth Amendment Links to an external site. to the U.S. Constitution, "No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." A bedrock feature of due process is fair notice to parties who may be affected by legal proceedings. An ex parte judicial proceeding, conducted without notice to, and outside the presence of, affected parties, would appear to violate the Constitution

A United States Supreme Court Links to an external site. decision, handed down the same day as their decision in Korematsu v. United States Links to an external site.. In Ex parte Endo, the Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of whether the United States Government had a right to exclude people of Japanese Links to an external site. ancestry from the West Coast Links to an external site. during World War II Links to an external site., they could not continue to detain a citizen that the government itself conceded was loyal to the United States Links to an external site.. This decision helped lead to the re-opening of the West Coast for resettlement by Japanese-American Links to an external site. citizens following their internment in camps across the United States during World War II.

Mitsuye Endo, the plaintiff in the case, was evacuated from Sacramento, California Links to an external site., in 1942, pursuant to Executive Order 9066 . Links to an external site.  In July 1942, she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus Links to an external site. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asking that she be discharged and restored to liberty. That petition was denied by the District Court in July 1943, and an appeal was perfected to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in August 1943.

The Conclusion: Decision: 9 votes for Endo, , 0 votes for the United States

 

 

 

 

 

The Supreme Court and Civil Rights

Civil Rights Cases (1883)

Between 1866 and 1875, Congress passed several civil rights acts to implement the 13th and 14th amendments. One was the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which imposed various criminal penalties against private businesses that practiced racial discrimination. Penalties were imposed on any owner of a public establishment or conveyance who practiced racial discrimination in the conduct of his or her business.

The Conclusion

In an 8-1 decision the Court decided that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional. Neither the 13th nor the 14th amendment empowers the Congress to legislate in matters of racial discrimination in the private sector, Bradley wrote. “The 13th Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race…but to slavery.…” The 14th Amendment, he continued, applied to State, not private, actions; furthermore, the abridgment of rights presented in this case are to be considered as “ordinary civil injur[ies]” rather than the imposition of badges of slavery.

Justice Bradley commented that “individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [14th] Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.” Therefore, the Court limited the impact of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

 

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

The Facts of the Case

The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.

 

The Constitutional Question

Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

 

The Conclusion

No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14thamendment intended to establish absolute equality of the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute discrimination.

 

Sweatt v. Painter (1950)

The Facts of the Case

In 1946, Herman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.

 

The Constitutional Question

Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

 

The Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)

The Facts of the Case

Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County.

 

The Constitutional Question

Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?

 

The Conclusion

Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation.

 

Brown v. Board of Education II (1955)

The Facts of the Case

After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief.

 

The Constitutional Question

What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I?

 

The Conclusion

The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

 

Reverse Discrimination

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

The Facts of the Case

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school had reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

 

The Constitutional Question

Was Bakke's discrimination prohibited by the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause and by the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

 

The Conclusion

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

 

Grutter v. Bollinger (2002)

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.

The Consitutional Question 

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

The Conclusion: Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

 

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted.

The Constitutional Question

Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

The Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Gratz, 3 vote(s) against
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

 

 

 

Fisher v. Texas (2016)

Facts of the Case In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the Top Ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission.

Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny.

The Constitutional Question 

Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit the consideration of race in undergraduate admissions decisions?

The Conclusion: Decision: 4 votes for UT Austin, 3 vote(s) for Fisher
Yes-The University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 4-3 majority. The Court held that the University of Texas’ use of race as a factor in the holistic review used to fill the spots remaining after the Top Ten Percent Plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Previous precedent had established that educational diversity is a compelling interest as long as it is expressed as a concrete and precise goal that is neither a quote of minority students nor an amorphous idea of diversity. In this case, the Court determined that the University of Texas sufficiently expressed a series of concrete goals along with a reasoned explanation for its decision to pursue these goals along with a thoughtful consideration of why previous attempts to achieve the goals had not been successful. The University of Texas’ plan is also narrowly tailored to serve this compelling interest because there are no other available and workable alternatives for doing so.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment categorically prohibits the use of race as a consideration in a higher education admissions process. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that majority’s decision was too deferential to the University of Texas’ determination that its use of race in the admissions process was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest and that the majority failed to properly apply strict scrutiny. Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was enacted at least in part to prevent the government from treating individuals as merely components of racial class, race-based classifications, regardless of their purpose must be subject to the strictest level of constitutional scrutiny. In this case, the University of Texas’ use of race in its admissions policy cannot withstand strict scrutiny because the University’s interest is not sufficiently clearly defined and therefore judicial review to determine whether the policy is narrowly tailored is impossible. Even if it were, the goal of demographic diversity could only feasibly be achieved using impermissible quotas for racial balancing that are based on stereotypes. Justice Alito also argued that the use of racial preferences is unnecessary to achieve the goal of diversity because the admissions process could use a race-neutral holistic review based on life experiences that would achieve the same effect. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.

Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Americans with Disabilities Act Cases

 

PGA Tour v. Martin (2001)

Facts of the Case  Casey Martin is afflicted with a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Casey made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations." Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.

 

The Constitutional Question 

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability? May a disabled contestant be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk?

The Conclusion: Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits the PGA from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability and that allowing Martin to use a cart, despite the walking rule, is not a modification that would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the game. "The purpose of the walking rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart," wrote Justice Stevens, noting Martin's fatiguing disability. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Same Sex Marriage

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Facts of the Case 

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

 

The Constitutional Question 

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

• The Conclusion

• Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

 

 

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